Taser Fails—Shots Fired In Times Square

Knives kill police-encounter subjects at a higher rate than guns do, a fact that runs against the instinct that a blade is somehow the lesser threat — and the fatal shooting of a woman who stabbed two people in Times Square is a case study in exactly why that counterintuitive statistic holds.

Key Points

  • A woman armed with two knives stabbed two bystanders near 42nd Street and Seventh Avenue in Times Square; the female victim died and the male victim was hospitalized in critical but stable condition.
  • Police confronted the suspect near the NYPD’s own Times Square substation, deployed a Taser without effect, and shot her when she refused to drop the knives and advanced on officers.
  • The suspect, identified in reporting as a 49-year-old Queens woman with a documented history of mental health contacts with the NYPD but no prior arrests, died of her injuries at the scene or shortly after.
  • Authorities said there was no indication of a terrorism motive; two officers were treated for injuries sustained during the encounter.
  • The case fits a well-documented and troubling pattern: knife-involved police encounters carry higher odds of fatality than firearm-involved ones, according to peer-reviewed research on U.S. police shootings.

What Happened in Times Square

The attack unfolded in the early evening on Seventh Avenue between 41st and 43rd Streets, one of the densest pedestrian corridors in the country even on an ordinary weekday. A woman carrying two knives stabbed a man and a woman without apparent provocation, inflicting what police described as life-threatening injuries on both. The female victim died from her wounds; the man survived and was reported in stable but serious condition. New York City police shot the woman after she allegedly stabbed the two victims, according to authorities’ own account of the sequence. She then moved north, toward the NYPD’s Times Square substation — the same outpost meant to project a visible police presence in the district — where responding officers intercepted her.

What followed, according to converging accounts from officers, bystanders, and video captured at the scene, was a compressed and volatile standoff. Officers ordered the woman to drop the knives. She refused, reportedly telling them she would rather kill them than comply. A Taser was deployed at least once, and by some bystander accounts several times, without incapacitating her. When she continued to advance rather than surrender, officers opened fire. Two officers were hospitalized for evaluation after the encounter, one account describing ringing in the ears consistent with proximity to gunfire in an enclosed urban canyon. The woman, reported in some coverage as a 49-year-old Queens resident with a documented psychiatric history known to the department but no prior criminal arrests, died of her injuries. Police said there was no evidence linking the attack to terrorism.

Why the Taser-to-Firearm Sequence Matters

The progression from verbal commands to Taser to firearm is not improvisation; it reflects a use-of-force continuum that departments train into officers precisely so that lethal force is a last resort rather than a first response. But that continuum collapses quickly when a subject is within striking distance and closing, because a knife does not require reloading, aiming, or a clear line of fire to be lethal — it requires only proximity. Courts have repeatedly wrestled with how much latitude officers get in exactly this kind of compressed decision window. In Kisela v. Hughes, the Supreme Court examined a claim that an officer should have used a Taser rather than a firearm against a knife-wielding suspect, ultimately finding the officer’s split-second judgment shielded by qualified immunity even amid competing expert opinion on what a “reasonable” response looked like. That precedent looms over every knife-involved shooting review that follows, including this one.

A Recurring Pattern, Not an Anomaly

Times Square has seen this scenario before, in different forms and with different names attached, which is itself instructive: crowded tourist plazas concentrate exactly the conditions — dense foot traffic, limited retreat routes, high visibility — that turn an isolated mental health crisis into a public-safety emergency requiring an instantaneous use-of-force decision. New York City’s NYPD substation in the middle of Times Square exists because the district’s volume of people and its symbolic value as a target require constant, visible policing; the same density that helps deter crime also means that any violent outburst happens in front of hundreds of witnesses and unfolds within seconds, not minutes. That combination has made Times Square something of a recurring stage for the broader national debate over how police should handle armed individuals who are, by every account, in psychiatric crisis rather than engaged in premeditated violence.

What the Data Actually Say About Knives

The instinct to treat a knife-wielding suspect as a lesser threat than an armed gunman does not hold up statistically. A national study of injurious police shootings between 2015 and 2020 found that knives were involved in roughly 15 percent of such incidents — and that victims injured by knives or blunt-force objects had higher odds of dying than those injured by firearms in the same dataset. The explanation is mechanical rather than mysterious: knife encounters happen at close range, force officers into split-second distance calculations, and rarely allow for graduated de-escalation once a subject is already inside striking distance. Departments have trained around a rule of thumb — that a suspect within roughly 21 feet can close on an officer before a holstered weapon is drawn — precisely because that proximity problem, not the knife’s raw lethality compared to a firearm, is what tends to drive the shoot decision.

What It Means Going Forward

Incidents like this one keep landing at the intersection of two policy debates that resist easy resolution: how aggressively cities should expand mental-health-specific crisis response, and how much room officers should be given when a subject with a documented psychiatric history becomes lethally violent in public. New York and other large departments have invested in co-responder and crisis-intervention programs designed to divert exactly these encounters away from armed confrontation — but those programs depend on advance contact, not on a woman who has already stabbed two strangers and is closing on officers with a blade in each hand. The unresolved tension is structural: the same crisis that makes de-escalation training necessary is often the crisis in which de-escalation training runs out of time. That is the sober lesson of Times Square, and it will recur wherever dense public space, untreated psychiatric illness, and armed confrontation intersect again.

Sources:

independent.co.uk, abc7.com, abc7ny.com